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12 December 2014 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR the Secretary of Defense 
FROM Deputy Undersecretary for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development  
SUBJECT: Increased Access to the Reserve Component during Periods Other Than War or 
National Emergency, Impact on the Army's Ability to Regenerate Combat Power 
1. Action Forcing Event 
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Army plans to reduce its active duty 
strength from a war-time high of 570,000 to 490,000 by the end of 2017.
1
 However, due to 
budget restrictions, it is likely that the Army end-strength will continue to shrink. Most analysts 
expect the Army will be cut further, to an Active-duty end-strength between 420,000 and 
380,000.
2




 To offset the risk assumed by a smaller force, the President and Department of Defense 
have directed the Army to maintain the ability to re-grow forces and capabilities. Both the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indicate that the 
Army should drawdown in a manner that will allow it to rapidly regenerate capabilities when they 
are needed in the future.
4
 The 2014 QDR states, "Although our forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations. . . We will protect the ability to regenerate 




                                                     
1 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert, CRS Report R42493 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing),  28 February 2014, 3. 
2 Sydney Freedberg, “Army Force Cuts: 3 Truths, 4 Fallacies, Breaking Defense, 24 February 2014, accessed 
at http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/the-army-force-cuts-3-truths-4-fallacies/. 
3 Statement on the Posture of the United States Army before the United States Senate Committee on Armed 
Services (statement of John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army and General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of 
the Army), 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 April 2014, 4. 
4 United States Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense, January 2012, 6. 





2. Statement of the Problem 
 The Army is faced with a significant overarching problem: How to reduce size and 
capability while maintaining the ability to regenerate quickly. Depending on the extent of the 
force cuts, the Army may have to grow by as many as 190,000 personnel to regain its 2012 
capability. The Army must be prepared to accomplish this growth while maintaining a high 
quality, all-volunteer force. 
 In April 2014, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox discussed 
problems related to the military drawdown with senior leaders at the Army War College. Fox 
explained that history demonstrates the United States will again need a capable ground force. 
"And so our challenge, your challenge, is to plan now to re-grow the army, even as you bring it 
down and how to reshape the army to support that growth in the future. We must determine what 
we need to retain in the smaller force to allow you to get to a larger force quickly, if necessary, 
when needed in the future."
6
  
 Due to a tightening budget, the Army is no longer expected to win in two simultaneous 
conflicts, a long-standing goal that has driven military force structure since the 1990s. In 
February 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined how a smaller Army means the 
United States must accept some risk in simultaneous or extended operations. The new force he 
notes will be “capable of decisively defeating aggression in one major combat theater - as it must 
be - while also defending the homeland and supporting air and naval forces engaged in another 
theater against an adversary."
7
 
 The Army has taken some measures to protect its ability to regenerate forces. The 2012 
Army Posture Statement identified four components that are critical to a smaller but expandable 
force. The report outlined how the Army would offset the strategic risk assumed as the active 
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force reduces from 570,000 to 490,000. The Army plan calls for a "strong cadre of 
noncommissioned and mid-grade officer to form the core of new formations," investing in Army 
Special Operations Forces, increasing the readiness of the National Guard and Army Reserve, and 
maintaining the nation's industrial base.
8
   
 Two years later, the Army's reduction is expected to substantially exceed the number 
proposed by the Army in 2012. As the extent of the cuts grow, some defense experts are 
concerned about the Army's apparent unwillingness to embrace the need to prepare the ability to  
conduct a much larger regeneration. In May 2014 the Center for New American Security (CNAS) 
strongly criticized the progress of Army and Department of Defense's (DOD) remobilization 
planning. "Unfortunately, since the 2012 (Defense Strategic Guidance) first articulated the 
principle of reversibility or regeneration, DOD and the Army have done little apparent work to 
determine the best way to implement it."
9
 
 When faced with the need to regenerate or mobilize forces quickly, the Army essentially 
has two options: First is to rely on the Reserve Component, a amalgamation of organizations 
including the National Guard and Army Reserve, to provide the bulk of the force. The second 
option is to grow the size and capability of the Active Component.  
 Both options have downsides. Growing the Active Component takes time and costs 
money. In addition, this option requires the Army to attract new volunteers, an undertaking that is 
difficult during wartime. Increased reliance on the Reserve Component has its own downsides. 
The most notable is that the reserve units and personnel are not as easily accessed as active duty 
troops. Federal law limits the number and scope of Reserve Component mobilizations especially 
for operations that are undertaken in times other than war or national emergency.  
                                                     
8 United States Army, 2012 Army Posture Statement, 17 February 2012, accessed at 
http://ocll.hqda.pentagon.mil/documents/2012_army_posture_statement.pdf, 5. 
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 This memorandum will analyze how the Army can maintain the ability to regenerate, 
potentially by as many as 190,000 troops, while still maintaining a quality force that can be 





3. History  
 The Army, more than any service, has a history of dramatic growth during conflict, and 
correspondingly spectacular reduction once hostilities conclude. Post-conflict force reductions 
have almost always exceeded the recommendations of the nation's military leadership. As a 
result, the Army has almost always been unprepared for its next war.  
 Three weeks after the end of the Revolutionary War, in September 1783, Congress 
ordered General George Washington to begin demobilization of the Federal Army. Concerned 
about the cost and potential threat a professional Army imposed, most Members of Congress 
believed that a "well-regulated and disciplined militia" should be the U.S. choice for defense. 
This belief was later reflected in the United States Constitution which grants Congress the sole 
authority to raise and support Armies. The Constitutions' authors discouraged professional ground 
forces by limiting the Army's funding to two-year increments.
10
 As a result, America's Armies 
have always been somewhat temporary. The Army’s mandated post-Revolutionary War 
drawdown was only the first ebb in the cyclic rhythm of Army force structure. 
 At the end of the Civil War the Army was drastically reduced again, this time against the 
wishes of senior military leaders. The Army had substantial post-war commitments in the 
occupied Southern states, the Western frontier, and the unstable Mexican border. Lieutenant 
General Ulysses S. Grant, General in Chief of the Army, requested that a Regular Army of 80,000 
men be retained. Congress, under pressure from the American people, and the troops themselves, 
ignored Grant’s appeal and instead sped the post-war demobilization. Between 1865 and 1869 
more than a million volunteers returned to their home states leaving a Regular Army of only 
27,442 and a poorly trained, under-equipped reserve of slightly more than 100,000.
11
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 In April 1898, an unsuspecting Army was called to free Cuba from Spanish colonial 
control. Utterly unprepared for the operation, the Army floundered as it struggled to regenerate 
the size and capability necessary for the operation. The mobilization was complicated by federal 
laws which prohibited the National Guard from deploying overseas. Guardsmen were eventually 
reorganized into volunteer regiments, and the force haphazardly deployed to Cuba, less than 100 
miles from the Florida Keys.
12
  
 The Army ultimately defeated the Spanish garrison in Cuba. Unfortunately, the cost of 
committing an unprepared force in a tropical climate, was high. Nearly four thousand troops died 
from disease and accidents. In contrast, less than three hundred were killed in action or died from 
wounds received in battle.
13
  
 The Army significantly reorganized in the wake of the Spanish American War. New 
doctrine called for the Regular Army to serve as the "peace nucleus of the greater war army of the 
Nation." It recommended an active force sized to win small overseas conflicts and capable of 
forming the "first line of defense in order to give sufficient time to permit the mobilization and 
concentration of our greater war army. . . "
14
 The report also recommended a federal reserve be 
maintained at a high state of readiness, a proposal that drew strong opposition from National 
Guard supporters in the House of Representatives who feared loss of state control over the 
organization.
15
 This was to be the first of many political skirmishes between the Active-Duty 
Army and the National Guard. 
 Ultimately, a compromise was reached. The National Defense Act of 1916 led to a 
substantial increase of the Regular Army and National Guard and mandated that the National 
                                                     
12 American Military History Vol. 1, 350. 
13 U.S. Army, Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into Service During the War With 
Spain, Washington DC: U.S. Army Adjutant General's Office, 13 December 1899, accessed at 
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/spanam/ws-stat.htm. 
14 U.S. Army War College Division, A Proper Military Policy for the United States,  Washington DC, March 
1915, accessed at: https://archive.org/stream/statementofprope00unitrich/statementofprope00unitrich_djvu.txt. 





Guard respond to federal mobilization. The act maintained the state's authority over the National 
Guard while providing the federal government access to a much larger force if required.  
 The Army’s efforts to anticipate and plan for the next conflict were tested when the U.S. 
entered the First World War in April 1918. By April of the following year, the Army had 
expanded from 200,000 to 3.7 million.
16
 As the First World War drew to a close, the War 
Department requested that Congress retain a Regular Army of 500,000 troops capable of further 
expansion in the event of another major war. However, the American public and Congress 
disagreed.
17
 By February 1919, National Guard units had been demobilized and the Active Army 
had been reduced to a volunteer force of 225,000. Cuts continued and over the three years, 
Congress mandated the Regular Army be limited to 137,000.
18
 
 Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the Army Staff prepared several series of mobilization 
plans designed to mitigate the risk associated with a small force. These Protective Mobilization 
Plans called for the Regular Army and National Guard to act as a security force to buy time for 
larger general mobilization. In addition, detailed plans were developed to transition U.S. industry 
into war capacity. Mobilization preparation continued throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, more money had appropriated for defense than 
during the entire the First World War.
19
  
 The rapid demobilization following World War II stood in stark contrast to the planned 
deliberate mobilization that proceeded the conflict. To meet the requirements of post-war 
occupations and stabilization, the Army prepared detailed demobilization plans. The Army sought 
to retain a peacetime structure capable of regenerating into a 4 million man force within one year. 
These plans were not sufficient to overcome the post-war pressure to get troops home quickly. 
                                                     
16 U.S. Army, American Military History Volume. 2, edited by Richard Stewart, Washington DC: U.S. Army 
Center of Military History, 2010, 21. 
17 Ibid., 55. 
18 Ibid., 61. 
19 Frank Schubert, Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War II, Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of 





 In August 1945, immediately following Japan's surrender, public and congressional 
pressure forced the War Department to scrap its plans for deliberate demobilization. The Army 
shrank further and faster than ever before. By 1946, half of the 8 million troops on Active duty 
had been released. Two years later, the Army had been reduced to less than one million.
20
 At the 
end of the decade, only 591,000 troops remained on active duty as U.S. policy shifted to rely on 
nuclear deterrence.
21
 Figure 1 provides a depiction of the scale of the post-World War II 
drawdown. 




                                                     
20 American Military History Vol. 2, 205. 
21 Ibid., 215. 
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 Many military experts disagreed with the drastic force reduction. General Douglas 
MacArthur, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, lamented the decimation of the Army, a 
powerful force that he felt could have been used to further U.S. interests. Instead, MacArthur 
wrote, "in the short space of five years this power had been frittered away in a bankruptcy of 
positive and courageous leadership toward any long-range objectives."
23
 The post-World War II 
Army's lack of readiness became painfully apparent when North Korea invaded South Korea in 
June 1950.  As the U.S. entered the conflict, the majority of Army units were far below 




 The first U.S. combat force dispatched to assist the South Korean defenses was Task 
Force Smith, an ill-fated battalion that was rushed to the Korean peninsula in a futile attempt to 
slow the North Korean advance. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the American force 
was decimated. General Douglas MacArthur later described the initially haphazard deployment of 
ground forces to Korea. "I had hoped by that arrogant display of strength to fool the enemy into a 
belief that I had greater resources at my disposal than I did."
25
 Although the America's 
commitment of forces did slow the North Korean advance, the cost was high. The first six months 
of the Korean War were marked by high casualties and humiliating defeats.  
 The Korean War demonstrated that the Army could not plan on full mobilization to win 
limited conflicts. In June 1950 Congress granted the President authority to activate individual 
members and units of the National Guard and Reserves. The Army, lacking an effective 
mobilization system, was unable to efficiently fill the ranks of both active duty and reserve units. 
As a result, many of the units initially committed to Korea were undermanned.
26
 Throughout the 
                                                     
23 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1964, 326. 
24 American Military History Vol. 2, 217. 
25 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 336. 
26 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction The First Year, Washington DC: U.S Army Center of Military 





conflict, the Army relied heavily on recalled World War II veterans to augment active duty units. 
Between 1950 and 1953 857,887 reservists were involuntarily mobilized.
27
 
 At the conclusion of active fighting in Korea, the Army was once again downsized as the 
nation reoriented military strategy towards nuclear forces. Between 1953 and 1958, the Army 
decreased from 1.5 million to 900,000.
28
 During the drawdown, the Army attempted to develop a 
balanced force that could win a conventional or limited war without large-scale mobilization. 
This structure was tested the following decade in Vietnam.   
 The Vietnam War was the first large-scale conflict in which the United States did not rely 
on the National Guard to provide combat troops. In 1965, as U.S. forces in Vietnam increased, 
President Lyndon Johnson declined to activate the National Guard and instead chose increase the 
draft. Although reasons for this decision have been debated, most historians conclude that 
Johnson sought to minimize the impact of an already unpopular war on the American public and 
Congress. "The President had become 'increasingly sensitive,' reported the New York Times, 'to 
the possible political effects of a reserve call-up."
29
 
 Throughout the Vietnam war the majority of the fighting fell to the Regular Army whose 
ranks were augmented with draftees. In 1964 the President's Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation examined the U.S. draft pool and concluded that even with the draft, a program of 
"manpower conservation" was necessary to generate enough youth for military service.
30
  By 
September 1965, as demand for Soldiers increased, the Army and DOD began to substitute 
civilians for military personnel in noncombat positions to free military personnel for combat duty. 
In addition the Army lowered medical and aptitude standards in an effort to widen the enlistment 
                                                     
27 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Involuntary Reserve Activations for U.S. Military 
Operations Since World War II, by Lawrence Knapp, 14 August 2000. 
28 American Military History Vol. 2, 261. 
29 James T. Currie, "The Army Reserve and Vietnam," Parameters, U.S. Army War College, 1984, accessed 
at: www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA531975. 
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 Although these measures increased the number of voluntary enlistments, the Army was 
still forced to rely on conscription to fill its ranks. As the number of troops admitted under 
reduced standards increased, so too did discipline problems and poor performance.
32
 The 
conclusion of the Vietnam War brought the end of the draft and a force reduction. The Active-
duty Army had grown to 1.57 million at the height of the conflict. By 1974, the Army had 
reduced to an all-volunteer force of 784,000 troops.
33
 
 To meet defense requirements with a smaller force the Army adopted the Total Army 
concept which involved shifting support capability to the Reserve Component. In addition to 
preserving capability, the interdependent Total Force required the reserves be activated in order 
for the U.S. to commit a significant military force anywhere. The Total Force structure conserved 
resources since reserve units cost less than their active-duty counterparts. In addition, the 
structure sought to address concerns that a volunteer force could become disconnected from 
society it was designed to serve. By the end of 1973, 66 percent of Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support capability was in the reserve force.
34
  
 The Total Force was refined throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  In 1990 the organization 
faced its first significant test as the Army responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Of the 297,000 
Army troops deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 39,000 were members 
of the Army Reserve and 37,000 were National Guardsmen.
35
  
 In 1992 a study commissioned by Congress found that the effectiveness of the Total 
Force Policy during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to be mixed. The report cited problems 
with the Army's readiness reporting systems. 
In general, the reserves were available and reported promptly when called during 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Further, the reserve combat support and combat 
                                                     
31 Edward Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, Washington DC: Department of Defense 
Historical Office, 2011, 267. 
32 This trend is discussed in detail in Section 6 (Policy Analysis). 
33 American Military History Vol. 2, 379. 
34 American Military History Vol. 2, 380. 






service support units required relatively little post-mobilization training to be 
ready for deployment. However, the Army National Guard combat units 




 The post-Cold War world led to new security challenges for the U.S. and new roles for 
the Army. The Army found itself increasingly deployed to unstable areas of the world to act as 
peacekeepers, provide humanitarian assistance, or protect U.S. interests. To meet these new 
missions, the Army restructured to reduce dependence on reserve support for immediate 
deployments. The Reserve Component was to backup active duty forces if required, later in the 
deployment.
37
 As the threat of conventional conflict with the Soviet Union evaporated, a large 
Army was not longer required. During the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the Army shrunk 39-percent.
38
 
 A decade later, simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army to face 
its largest manpower requirement since the Vietnam War. From the beginning of the conflicts the 
Army had difficulty meeting demands. In July 2003, four months after the initial invasion of Iraq, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make 
the National Guard more "relevant and accessible in the current national security environment."
39
  
The National Guard responded with a plan to transform the organization into a more ready force. 
"We are transforming the National Guard from a strategic reserve to be called only in time of 
World War III, to be an operational force that can be called at any time, any place, for any reason, 




                                                     
36 Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of 
Defense, Santa Monica, RAND, 1992, accessed at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR140-1.pdf, xxi. 
37 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve 
Components, by Alice R. Buchalter and Seth Elan, Washington DC, October 2007, accessed at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Reorganization-Reserve-Components.pdf, 19. 
38 Bernard Rostker, Right Sizing the Force: Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military 
Personnel, Center for a New American Security, June 2013, accessed at 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_RightSizingTheForce_Rostker_0.pdf, 13. 
39 Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve, 33. 
40 LTG H. Steven Blum, The National Guard: Full Spectrum Force in the Global War on Terror, Foreign 





 As the Active and Reserve Components strained under the requirements of the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army attempted to accomplish more with less personnel. Soldiers 
whose periods of active duty service were ending were involuntarily retained on active duty, a 
process known as Stop Loss. Units were reorganized to allow for more "tooth" and less "tail." 
Civilian personnel were hired to fill non-combat positions. Roles traditionally filled by support 
troops such as food preparation and base security were contracted to civilian firms in order to 
make more troops available for combat duty.
41
  
 In addition to mobilizing reserve units, the Army activated members of the Individual 
Ready Reserve (IRR), a reserve component made up of members whose initial military 
commitment was complete. The IRR mobilization was largely a failure. In 2006 the Army only 
had accurate contact information for 20-percent of IRR members. Many activated members 
simply failed to respond to their mobilization orders. Army reserve managers were quoted as 
declaring that "using the (Individual Ready Reserve) as a solution for unit manning is a failed 
concept." and recommending that the force only be recalled in the event of full mobilization." A 
2008 congressional report concluded that the Army's attempt to use the IRR as "a viable source of 
manpower for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been problematic."
42
 
 The Army's reorganization allowed a higher percentage of troops to be committed into 
combat however it did not solve the Army's capacity problem. A steadily declining enlistment 
rate exacerbated troop shortages. Despite increased bonuses and advertising, in 2005 the Army 
was forced to reduce entrance standards to the lowest since the Vietnam War. A 2007 a Defense 
Department study reported the Army Reserve, and National Guard were unable to meet the 
increased demand presented by Iraq, Afghanistan and the domestic responsibilities of civil 
                                                     
41 Library of Congress Federal Research Division,  Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the 
United States? by Edward F. Bruner, Washington DC, 28 May 2004, accessed at http://fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf, 3. 
42 Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-









 In January 2007 after four years of combat in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, the Chief of 
Staff of the Army announced a plan to increase the size of the Army by an additional 74,200 
Soldiers. The increase was never fully realized. The majority of U.S. troops left Iraq in 2011 and 
with combat troops preparing to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the nation no longer 
needed a large ground force. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance announced that 
although the Army would retain the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capability gained 





                                                     
43 Defense Science Board, Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on 
Terrorism, Washington DC, September 2007, accessed at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA478163.pdf. 







 History has demonstrated that at some point in the future the Army will once again be 
called on to expand into a formidable ground force. Major General H.R. McMaster, currently the 
commander of the Army's Capabilities Integration Center, noted in a 2013 NY Times op-ed, that 
the fundamental nature of conflict has not changed. "Budget pressures and persistent fascination 
with technology have led some to declare an end to war as we know it. . . We must not equate 
military capabilities with strategy. Achieving our aims in war will demand forces who can 
reassure allies and protect populations, as well as identify and defeat elusive enemies. "
45
  
 The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review articulates the need for an Army that is capable 
of growing to provide the capabilities McMaster describes. To accomplish this goal, the Army 
must be able to grow to rapidly and efficiently while maintaining an all-volunteer force that is 
capable of operating effectively on today's complex and technical battlefields.  
 The recruiting problems experienced during the height of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are likely to be repeated in the event of future protracted conflict. Between 2003 and 
2008 the military experienced what Clifford Stanley, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness, described as "the most challenging recruiting environment since the inception of 
the All-Volunteer Force in 1973."
46
 During this period the Army, Army Reserve, and Army 
National Guard all had difficulty meet recruiting goals. A healthy U.S. economy combined with 
increased casualties rates in Iraq, led to a severe shortage of recruits. In 2005 the Army Reserve 
and Army National Guard missed their recruiting goals by 16-percent and 20-percent respectively 
while the Regular Army fell 8-percent short.
47
  
 The Army's efforts to attract the necessary number of recruits was unprecedented. The 
Army added over 2,500 additional recruiters, raised the maximum age from 35 to 42, and added 
                                                     
45 H.R. McMaster, "The Pipe Dream of Easy War," New York Times, 20 July 2013, accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
46 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on DOD Authorization for Appropriations FY 2011, 
111th Cong, 2nd Session, 10 March 2010, 9. 
47 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2011 





enlistment bonuses of $40,000. Between 2000 and 2007 the cost per Army recruit nearly doubled 
(See Figure 2).  




 The Army was also forced to lower entrance standards. As a result, the quality of Army 
recruits declined substantially between 2005 and 2007. By 2007, only 79-percent of Army 
recruits had high school diplomas, and only 61-percent scored above average on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test, the lowest scores since the 1980s. The number of waivers granted for 
previously disqualifying medical or criminal history also increased substantially. Between 2003 




 As Army enlistment standards lowered, violent and nonviolent crime, substance abuse, 
and suicide among troops increased. A 2012 Army report, Generating Health and Discipline in 
the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset, found that "Soldiers with conduct waivers had a lesser 
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probability of [separating from the Army] in their first year but a 13% higher probability to 
[separate] by the end of their first term of enlistment. Those with a drug waiver, moreover, had a 
38% greater probability of [separating] in the same period."
50
  (Figure 3 depicts how, as the 
number of Soldiers with waivers increased, the number of Soldiers testing positive for illegal 
drugs nearly doubled.) 




 The study concluded that soldiers admitted with waivers were more likely to commit 
crimes than those admitted under the previous standards. 
The waivered population (as a cohort) committed over twice as many criminal 
offenses when compared against the non-waivered population with percentages 
ranging between 29-36% as compared to 15%. Those with drug waivers were 6 
times more likely to commit a drug offense than the non-waivered cohort with 
20% committing drug offenses compared to 3% of the remaining population. 
Additionally the waivered population was 2-3 times more likely to commit 
specific crimes while serving, including felony offenses of aggravated assault, 
failure to obey, and desertion; and misdemeanor offenses of AWOL, DUI, assault 
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 Waivers were not limited to criminal and drug history. Increasingly throughout the mid-
2000s, more recruits had preexisting mental health conditions. Today, a large number of these 
Soldiers remain on active duty. In 2014, researchers found that 25-percent of Soldiers met the 
criteria for having a mental health disorder. Of that group, 77-percent reported the disorder began 
prior to their entrance into the Army.
53
 
 By 2009 the Army's recruiting difficulties had stabilized. A Congressional report 
attributed this to three primary factors. First, the economic downturn increased the unemployment 
rate driving more people chose military service. Second, pay and benefits improved significantly 
during this period. During the previous decade, Congress took measures to better align military 
compensation with the civilian workforce. The resulting improvement in housing allowances and 
pay coupled with increased educational benefits made military service a more attractive option 
for many. Finally, casualty rates decreased significantly following the 2007 Iraq troop surge.
54
 
 The factors that solved the Army's recruiting crisis may not have a lasting effect. As the 
economy recovers potential recruits will become increasingly attracted to non-military 
employment. Budget pressure is leading to decreases in housing allowances and other benefits. 
More attractive civilian employment options mean that the Army will face increased difficulty 
attracting qualified recruits even during peacetime.  Evidence indicates this trend may have 
already begun. The Army's reserve components are currently experiencing difficulty attracting 
qualified recruits. In 2013, the National Guard failed to meet its recruiting goals,
55
 and  the Army 
Reserve was unable to meet its goals this year.
56
 The Chief of the Army Reserve recently directed 
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all Army Reserve units to "capitalize on all possible resources" retain and recruit personnel in 
response to a "critical" manpower shortage.
57
 
 Attracting volunteers during a conflict and competition from higher paying civilian jobs 
are not the only problem that faces the Army's recruiting efforts. America's recruiting pool is 
increasingly unfit for service. According to Major General Allen Batschelet, commander of the 
U.S. Army Recruiting Command, 70-percent of the U.S. population age 17 to 24 is not qualified 
for military service due to obesity, criminal history, or cognitive ability. Batschelet explained that 
the shrinking recruit pool could present problems for the Army in the coming years. "I think that 
there are some really troubling signs on the horizon that we may not be able to find the quality 
that we seek or need. And without that solid quality foundation, we would be hard pressed to 
respond to whenever the nation needs us next."
58
 
 Not only is number of qualified candidates smaller, American youth are less attracted to 
military service. Virginia Penrod, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel, summed 
up future recruiting obstacles in recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. 
"Despite our continued recruiting success, the recruiting process does have inherent challenges. 
The size of our youth market is finite. Today, nearly 75 percent of our youth are not qualified for 
military service with medical conditions and weight accounting for most of the disqualifications. 
Compounding eligibility concerns is the lack of youth interested in military service."
59
 
 The Army Reserve Structure is currently unprepared to support the growth required to 
regenerate the Active Army. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), is made up of personnel who 
have recently received military training either in the Active Army or Selected Reserve (Army 
National Guard or Army Reserve). IRR members can be activated in a manner similar to the 
Selected Reserve. Unlike the Selected Reserve and the Active Component, the IRR end strength 
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is not directly mandated by Congress, but is instead the end product of Army personnel policy. 
All Soldiers who join the Army agree to serve for eight years. The amount of time spent assigned 
to an active duty or selected reserve unit varies according to the individual Soldier's enlistment 
agreement or service obligation. At the conclusion of the Soldier's active commitment, he or she 
is moved into the Individual Ready Reserve for the remaining term.  
 The IRR could provide the necessary pool of junior soldiers required to grow the Army 
however, it's size is not predictable. IRR end-strength is not directly mandated by law like the 
Selected Reserve and Active Component. Instead, its size fluctuates based on the number of 
personnel who exit the Active or Reserve Component with a remaining service obligation. 
Each military service component has its own IRR. As of September 2013, the combined total of 
all service's IRRs was 259,909. This is down from 776,080 in 1993 and 370,858 in 2000.
60
 In 




Senior Uniformed Army Leadership 
 The Chief of Staff of the Army and other senior uniformed leaders can be expected to 
oppose increased reliance on the reserve component. To date their stance has been to warn of the 
dangers of reducing the Active Component the hope that this will move Congress to lessen the 
severity of the cuts. In October 2014 the Army unveiled a new operational doctrine that will 
allow the Army to conduct multiple simultaneous small-scale operations throughout the world 
instead of traditional "major theater wars." Known as the Army Operating Concept, this approach 
also preserves many of the headquarters units required to conduct a larger scale conflict. The new 
operating concept is based on the assumption that the Army will "adjust to fiscal constraints and 
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have resources sufficient to preserve the balance of readiness, force structure, and modernization 
necessary to meet the demands of the national defense strategy in the mid-to-far term."
62
   
National Guard and Army Reserve Senior Leadership 
 The National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve senior leadership want their organizations 
to be viewed as an operational reserve that is ready to contribute immediately rather than a 
strategic reserve.  Both the Army Reserve and National Guard can be expected to support 
legislation and policies elevate the Reserve Component's role in the Total Force.  
Congress 
 The majority of Members of Congress can be expected to oppose any efforts to decrease 
National Guard capability within their state, even if they support cuts nationally. The National 
Guard has ties to every congressional district. This makes National Guard force structure changes 
difficult. Congress recently blocked an Army attempt to trade National Guard attack helicopters 
for utility aircraft currently in active duty units. Army attempts explain the need for the move 
were met with Congressional scrutiny, "The Army National Guard is the combat reserve of the 
Army, and I share other Senators' deep concern about removing all attack aviation capability from 
the Guard," stated Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).
63
 Congress can be expected to continue strict 
scrutiny of any policy that affects Reserve Component force structure. 
Interest Groups 
 The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is a non-profit organization that 
advocates for the United States Army. The association is among the most powerful military 
professional organizations with 75,000 members. The association can be expected to oppose 
efforts to reduce Active Component end strength.  
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 National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) Arguably the most powerful 
military advocacy organizations. NGAUS can be expected to aggressively defend the National 
Guard from budget cuts.
64
 The association will support legislation that strengthens the role of the 
National Guard as a part of the Total Force. 
 The Reserve Officer Association (ROA) is a reserve forces advocacy group. In 2014 the 
group has expressed support for a more capable, well-equipped reserve force that is a central 
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5. Policy Proposal 
a. Policy Authorizing Tool 
 This memorandum analyzes a proposal to introduce legislation designed to increase 
access to reserve forces in a situation other than war or national emergency. Section 12304 of 
Title 10 United States Code authorizes the President to involuntarily activate members of the 
Selected and Individual Ready Reserve in times other than war or national emergency. Since 
1990, every large military operation has required mobilization of reserve forces. In every 
instance, with the exception of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve mobilizations were 
authorized under Section 12304. Reservists were mobilized under this authorization to support 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, the 1995 Bosnia peacekeeping 
mission, and the Kosovo conflict.
66
 Since September 11, 2001reserve mobilizations have been 
authorized under the national emergency declared after the 9-11 terror attacks which allowed for 
the mobilization of one million reservists. As time and circumstances distance the nation from the 
events of September 11th, future mobilizations will require separate authorizations that will likely 
be more restrictive. 
 In its current form Section 12304 authorizes the activation of up to 200,000 members of 
the Selected Reserves. Not more than 30,000 of these personnel may be members of the 
Individual Ready Reserve. The proposed legislative amendment would increase the total number 
of reservists that can be activated to 350,000 of which 100,000 may be members of the IRR.  
 As the Army's budget is cut, it is being forced to choose between sacrificing readiness or 
capability. The primary purpose of the proposed legislation is to reassure the Army that in the 
future, the Reserve Component will be accessible for a variety of contingences. As budget cuts 
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necessitate tough choices, it is designed to provide the Army the tools to develop policies that 
lead to more efficient use of both the Active and Reserve Components.   
b. Implementation method 
 The proposed legislative change will be simultaneously introduced as separate bills in the 
House of Representatives and Senate in January 2015. There the bill will be referred to the Senate 
and House Armed Services Committees for inclusion in the 2015 National Defense Authorization 
Act. The Senate bill will be sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the incoming Chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator McCain is currently the ranking Republican 
member of the Senate committee. He has been supportive of legislation and policies designed to 
preserve an efficient and effective military. In 1996, during the last military drawdown, Senator 
McCain stressed the importance of a Reserve Component that can contribute to the Total Force.  
"If these forces are required for the successful resolution of a conflict, then they must be ready to 
perform their mission when called upon. The current budget climate makes it increasingly 
difficult to justify the expenditure of scarce funds on forces which are not capable of significantly 
enhancing our national security. "
67
 Today, in a period of similar fiscal austerity, Senator 
McCain's perspective remains applicable. 
 The House Bill will be introduced by Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX), the 
incoming Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Thornberry has been 
supportive of efforts to reform military structure. In 2014, he sponsored a bill to establish the 
Office of Net Assessment, an organization that is designed to allow the Department of Defense 
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6. Policy Analysis 
 The analysis contained in this section examines the positive and negative consequences 
of amending Section 12304 to allow more reservists to be activated in situations other than 
declared war or national emergency. 
a. Advantages 
 As operations related to the Global War on Terror wind down, there is increased 
likelihood that future mobilizations will be constrained by the limits of Section 12304. As a 
result, the Army cannot depend on full integration of the reserve component for all potential 
operations. The proposed amendment to Section 12304 will positively impact the Army's ability 
to regenerate size and capability in the following ways: 
Effectiveness 
Retain High Quality Force in the Event of Partial Mobilization 
 The proposed policy will ensure that the Army is filled with higher quality personnel 
quality in the event of a mobilization. Currently, if required to increase size, the Army must rely 
on recruiting to fill its ranks. As discussed earlier, attracting the necessary number of qualified 
candidates during peacetime is challenging, even when the U.S. job market is weak. If the U.S. is 
engaged in a conflict, or the economy is strong, any significant mobilization will likely be 
hampered by lack of volunteers, especially for combat arms occupations. The Army will be once 
again forced to lower enlistment standards and find other methods to attract the necessary number 
of recruits. The effect will be similar to the reduction of standards during the Vietnam War, and 
the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,  
 Reducing enlistment standards have historically resulted in negative consequences for the 
Army. Misconduct, mental health problems, and drug use all increased when the Army reduced 
recruiting standards between 2005 and 2009. The spike in problems was not without precedent. 





Vietnam War.  It is too soon to know the long-term impact of the recent decline in standards 
however, studies of the Vietnam era standards reduction offer insight into what may come.  
Case Study - Project 100,000 
 In 1966 the Department of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary McNamara, 
initiated a recruiting program designed to enroll men who would have been disqualified for low 
AFQT scores. The program, which became known as Project 100,000, sought not only to quench 
the military's need for active duty manpower, but to also "salvage" a segment of the population 
that had little opportunity for advancement. Each service was directed to establish special training 
units where the lower-aptitude recruits would receive special instruction to overcome their 
shortcomings.  In all, nearly 350,000 military personnel were admitted into the military under 




 Service members admitted under the reduced standards of Project 100,000 
underperformed in every significant indicator of potential to succeed in the military. The lower-
aptitude enlistees tended have poorer performance in training and have more discipline problems 
than their higher-aptitude counterparts.
70
 Although the majority of the men admitted under Project 
100,000 served honorably, their service failed to provide the "uplifting" effect predicted by 
McNamara. Additionally, the program perpetuated the widespread public belief that the Vietnam 
War was being fought by America's poor and uneducated. 
 In 1986 a Department of Defense study measured the long-term impact of military 
service on Project 100,000 enlistees. The report concluded that 20 years later, the lower-aptitude 
recruits admitted during the Vietnam era earned less money, were more likely to be unemployed, 
divorced, or deceased than both veterans of higher aptitude, and those of similar aptitude who did 
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not serve in the military. In 1990 the study's authors testified to Congress  "these results suggest 
that Project 100,000 was less than successful in its stated goal of providing low-aptitude and 




 Since 2004 the Army's suicide rate, traditionally lower than the civilian sector, steadily 
increased until it surpassed the civilian rate in 2008. A recent study conducted by the National 
Institute for Health indicates that this trend may have been influenced by increases in mental 
health and aptitude waivers. The study found that Soldiers whose AFQT score is in the bottom 
50th percentile have a history of mental health disorder, and who joined after the age of 27 are 
more likely to commit suicide while in the Army.
72
 Between 2005 and 2009, as a result of 
lowered enlistment standards, significantly more personnel who fall into these three categories 
were admitted into the Army. 
 The proposed legislation will mute some of the negative consequences of growing the 
volunteer force quickly by allowing the Army easier access to the Reserve Component, especially 
the IRR. A dependable, quality reserve force will delay the need to admit lower quality recruits. 
Although some standards reduction may still be necessary, especially if a large mobilization is 
required, the total quality of the force will remain higher than under the current system. 
Negative Consequences of Overburdened Recruiting System 
 Between 2005 and 2009 the Army's recruiting system was placed under tremendous 
pressure to attract the numbers of volunteers needed to sustain the Army. As popular support for 
the war in Iraq waned, the Army failed to attract enough volunteers. Recruiters were pressured to 
bend the rules to get candidates into the Army. A second disturbing trend was an increase in 
depression and suicides among Army recruiters. 
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 Between 2005 and 2009, Army recruiters were placed under enormous pressure to get 
recruits. In May 2005 the New York Times published the results of anonymous interviews with 
dozens of Army recruiters across the country. The article described widespread fraud as recruiters 
struggled to meet quotas. "Several spoke of concealing mental-health histories and police records. 
They described falsified documents, wallet-size cheat sheets slipped to applicants before the 
military's aptitude test and commanding officers who look the other way. And they voiced doubts 
about the quality of some troops destined for the front lines."
73
 Recruiter bending of the rules 
amplified effects of the Army's official relaxation of standards. Although the actual number of 
ineligible recruits is difficult to calculate, it is likely the number of lower quality personnel that 
were admitted during the mid-2000s is higher  than the official statistics.   
 Stress and pressure took a toll on the recruiters themselves. Between 2001 and 2009 
seventeen Army recruiters committed suicide, four of them from the Houston Recruiting 
Battalion. The spike in suicides prompted Congressional interest and an Army investigation. The 
inquiry concluded that the Houston battalion had a "poor command climate" and a "unhealthy and 
singular focus on production at the expense of soldier and family considerations."
74
 Senator John 
Cornyn, R-Texas, later told reporters, "This is a very disturbing repot . . . This is not an isolated 




 More reliable access to the IRR for a variety of contingencies will allow the Army to use 
IRR members to augment Active and Reserve units. The proposed change to Title 10 will allow 
the Army to utilize IRR members to make up for the expected decrease in recruits. As a result, the 
Army will be able to regenerate to current size and capacity with less pressure on the recruiting 
system.  
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 The cost of maintaining a Reserve Component unit is substantially less than a similar 
Active duty counterpart. The proposed legislation will provide the Army flexibility to move 
capabilities into the Reserve Component and be guaranteed access when needed. As a result, the 
Army will have the opportunity to increase efficiency.  
 The main difference in cost between Active and Reserve Component units can be 
attributed to personnel costs (pay and benefits). The annual cost to maintain an Infantry Brigade 
Combat Team during peacetime is $277 million of which 94-percent is personnel cost. A similar 
National Guard unit costs $66 million during peacetime. It costs approximately $97 million and 
three months to prepare the National Guard unit for deployment. The Active Component brigade 
can deploy for $8 million and requires less training time.
76
 
 The Army's current efforts to cut cost by reducing the readiness of the Active Component 
is not an efficient method. Reducing the training and maintenance funding of a typical Active 
duty unit only impacts a small percentage of the budget (only 6-percent of an Infantry Brigade 
Combat Team cost). The largest bill, personnel cost, remains. Unready Active Component units 
can take as long as well maintained Reserve Component units to train and deploy. Allowing the 
Army to commit a large Reserve Component force for the most likely future conflicts gives the 
Army the ability to reduce cost while maintaining similar capability.   
More Capable Total Force  
 Today, the Army must plan to accomplish most required missions in the absence of 
declared war or national emergency. Since the end of the Second World War the Army has not 
been called to fight in a declared war. Despite the use of the national emergency following the 
September 11th attacks to justify mobilization of the Army for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is 
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unlikely that that the next conflict the Army will participate in will be the result of such an attack.
 Therefore that Army must remain prepared to undertake a fairly large combat operation 
without large-scale activation of the Reserve Component. This requirement has caused the Army 
to be hesitant to move critical capabilities into the Reserve Component. Increasing access to the 
Reserve Component, including larger numbers of the IRR, will allow the Army to commit the 
appropriate forces to the next conflict. In addition, increased reliance on the Reserve Component 
will allow the National Guard to truly achieve its objective of becoming an operational reserve. 
Administrative/Technical Capacity 
A More Accessible Individual Ready Reserve  
 The Individual Ready Reserve is does not currently play a critical role in the Army's 
mobilization plans, especially for partial mobilizations. The primary reason for this is lack of 
access. Under Section 12304 no more than 30,000 IRR members can be mobilized across all 
military departments. As a result, the IRR has been largely ignored by Army mobilization 
planners. Increasing the number of IRR members who can be activated for operations other than 
war will provide the Army incentive to incorporate the IRR into a more meaningful role in the 
total force.  
 The IRR's lack of capability was demonstrated during activations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan when less than 50-percent of members responded to their mobilization notices. The 
primary reason for the IRR's failure is that the Army has not prioritized it as part of the Total 
Force. More reliable access to this important segment of the Reserve Component will encourage 
the Army to fix the IRR system. 
 Garri Hendell, a senior Army civilian in the Army National Guard Personnel Policy 
Division outlined the problems facing the IRR system in an article published in Military Review. 
According to Hendell, the IRR is hindered by a shortage of resources and lack of institutional 





the IRR a more effective organization.
77
 If the Army can depend on access to the IRR, it will 
undertake prioritize the changes needed to fix the IRR. The result will be the IRR's efficient 
integration as a contributor to the Total Force. 
Equality/Liberty 
Reduction in Criminal Activity Associated with a Stressed Recruiting System 
 Attempting to attract volunteers by increasing the amount of money spent on recruiting 
stresses the defense contracting systems and increases the likelihood of abuse. As the Army 
struggled to attract recruits during the mid-2000s, the Army National Guard and Regular Army 
introduced incentive programs to encourage current Guard members to provide recruiting 
referrals. Bonuses ranged between $2,000 and $7,500 for each referral that resulted in an 
enlistment. Fraud and abuse was widespread in the program between 2005 and 2010. Some 
National Guard recruiters collaborated with other Guard members to obtain bonuses for recruits 
who already planned on joining the National Guard. In other instances, high school counselors 
were given bribes in return for the names of students who were already considering joining the 
National Guard.
78
 Investigations by the Department of Justice and Army have resulted in the 
indictments and convictions of numerous National Guard members.
79
  
 Allegations for fraud are not limited to individual recruiters, in October 2014, five senior 
National Guard officials and one civilian were charged with bribery involving $14.6 million in 
marketing, recruitment, and retention contracts.
80
 Earlier this year, the commander of the U.S. 
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Army Criminal Investigative Command testified before Congress that the total extend of the 
recruiting fraud may exceed $100 million.
81
 
 The proposed legislation will limit the risk of recruiting fraud. Less dependence on the 
Army and National Guard recruiting system during a mobilization, will decrease opportunities for 
fraud and abuse. As a result, both Service members and the American taxpayers will be protected. 
 b. Disadvantages 
 The most significant negative consequences of the proposed policy action are related to 
the potential for over-reliance on the Reserve Component, including the IRR. As the reserves 
become a more important part of the Total Force, care must be taken to ensure they remain ready 
and are not overcommitted. Failure to do so could lead to a force that is unable to rapidly respond 
to emerging threats and sustain membership due to loss of community support. 
The Risk of an Unprepared Army 
 The Army's Total Force concept incorporates the reserve component into nearly all 
military operations. However, there are challenges that are unique to deploying reserve units. 
Reserve Component units have limited training time, and as a result are maintained at a lower 
state of readiness than their Active Component counterparts. Traditionally, the activation of 
National Guard and Army Reserve units is followed by months of training before the units are 
deployed. The length of this training depends on the baseline readiness that the unit is able to 
maintain. To effectively utilize Reserve Component units, the Army must have effective tools to 
measure this readiness. 
 The Army experienced the difficulties associated with assessing the readiness of reserve 
forces during the mobilization for Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Although Reserve 
Component forces largely performed effectively, Army National Guard combat units were not as 
                                                     






prepared as pre-conflict reporting indicated.
82
 This did not present a critical problem at the time 
because the United States set the tempo of the conflict. The post-Cold War drawdown had not yet 
occurred and the 700,000 strong active force was able to backfill any reserve units that were 
unable to deploy. A 1992 DOD force structure assessment noted, "During the Persian Gulf War, 
we were able to call the forces that were needed, when they were needed, and still had a very 
large residual force of active and reserve units to deter adventurism in other parts of the world."
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 The current drawdown ensures that the Army will not have the capacity to make up for 
unready combat units. In future conflicts, the consequences of overestimating combat readiness 
could be more dire than during the Gulf War. As the Army becomes more dependent on the 
Reserve Component, it must prioritize the administrative capability to monitor and maintain 
readiness.  
Potential for Loss of Employer and Community Support 
 A second potentially negative consequence of this legislation is the potential for the 
Army to overuse the Reserve Component. In turn, this could lead to a loss in support from 
employers, communities, and reservists themselves. Joint Publication 4-05 warns "the impact of 
transferring productive members of the civilian sector into the military must be carefully 
weighed. Commanders must prudently weigh their needs to support a crisis with RC members 
with the needs of the civilian sector and its impact on future RC readiness."
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 There are indications that the conflicts of the past decade have begun to have a negative 
impact on the support employers have for their employees membership in the Reserve 
Component. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA) of 1994 
mandates that reservists' civilian jobs are secured while they are absent for military service.  
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 In February 2012, Ted Daywalt, CEO of VetJobs testified before Congress about the risk 
of losing employer support for membership in the Reserve Component. He warned that although 
businesses sought the skills and experience veterans provide, they do not want the burden 
associated with employees leaving for military service. "The message is they want to hire 
veterans,” he said, “but they cannot go broke supporting their National Guard employees with 




 Department of Labor statistics show a relationship between repeated use of the Reserve 
Component and civilian employer discrimination against reservists. Between 2005 and 2011, as 
reservists were increasingly called to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of 




 Increased access to the Reserve Component and IRR may create an environment where 
employers are less inclined to hire reservists. The consequences of over-commitment of the 
Reserve Component can be mitigated by increasing the size of the Active Component in the event 
the U.S. becomes involved in a protracted conflict. 
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7. Political Analysis  
a. Key Stakeholders 
Senior Army Leadership (Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army) 
The proposed legislative change is designed to provide the Army greater flexibility in how it can 
allocate forces between the Active and Reserve Components. Army planners will be able to better 
anticipate what resources will be available and how they can be employed. Senior Army leaders 
will support the proposed legislation because of the increased flexibility it will provide. 
 In September 2014, General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, testified before the House 
Armed Services Committee that projected cuts will reduce the Army's capability to a point that it 
will be unable to perform  the tasks outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.  
“In my professional military judgment, these projected end strength and force 
structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense 
Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat 
operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a 
second theater . . . Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to 
defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage 




 The need for change is dire. By its own admission, the Army will become unable to 
accomplish its assigned missions. The proposed legislative change offers the Army increased 
flexibility to move capabilities between the Reserve and Active Components. Increased access to 
reserve forces will mitigate the Army leadership's aversion to cutting Active Component end 
strength.  
National Guard and Army Reserve Senior Leadership 
 Senior leaders in both the Army Reserve and National Guard can be expected to support 
the proposed legislation. They view their organizations as good investments during times of fiscal 
austerity. “If you reduce the size of the Army Reserve, you don’t really save any money, because 
we’re already. . . pretty efficient,” Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve 
                                                     







recently stated. “As we have to come down, perhaps, in our active-component strength, one of the 
ways that you mitigate that risk in national security architecture is by investing more in the 
reserve component -- not less."
88
 
President of the United States 
 The President can be expected to support the proposed legislation. Future conflicts are 
more likely to require mobilizations under conditions other than war or national emergency. 
President Barack Obama has already used Section 12304 to activate a limited number of Reserve 
Component units and IRR members to respond to both the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the more 
recent Ebola epidemic in Africa. The proposed legislative change provide the President more 
options when dealing with crisis. 
Congress 
 The majority of Congress can be expected to be supportive of the proposed legislative 
change. Legislative issues that involve the Reserve Component are generally subject to increased 
congressional scrutiny. Unlike the Active Component, National Guard and Reserve units are 
located in every state and territory. The proposed legislation offers an alternative to cutting the 
Reserve Component budget, an option that will affect every congressional district . 
 Changing Title 10 to allow the Army more flexibility to rely on the Reserve Component 
will protect National Guard and Reserve units from budget cuts. Although there will be some 
congressional opposition, the measure can be expected to be more palatable to Congress than 
other measures such as base realignment and closure. 
 Over the past year Army efforts to include the National Guard in force reductions have 
been strongly opposed by Congress. Although members understand the need to reduce cost, they 
do not want their districts to feel the associated financial pain. Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran 
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(R-MS) expressed this view in June 2014. “Restructuring the Army may be necessary, but we 
shouldn’t rush into any plan that has a disproportionate impact on the Guard in Mississippi.”
89
  
 Although the proposed change to Title 10 avoids impacting every member of congress, 
not all can be expected to support the change. Members of Congress from districts where Active 
duty Army units are stationed, will be less supportive of the plan. However, the change to Title 10 
will generate considerably less opposition from these members than other cost cutting options. 
According to the Center for New American Security, Congress can be expected to oppose most 
defense reforms.  
Members of  Congress have strong incentives to oppose some of these reforms, 
especially BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) and changes to military 
compensation, because they generate strong opposition from affected 
constituents. Indeed, while defense experts widely agree that another round of 
BRAC is both necessary and desirable, Congress has blocked past BRAC 
proposals due to local economic and employment concerns – and early signs 





 The proposed change to Title 10 does not directly impact the Army's budget or structure. 
Instead, the legislation erects a framework that allows the Army to increase its reliance on the 
Reserve Component for the most likely mobilization scenarios. Congress is more likely to focus 
attention on specific policy actions that emerge as a result of the change. This congressional 
interest must be addressed by the Army and Department of Defense when the time comes. For 
example, Active Component cuts may need to be distributed across congressional districts to 
minimize negative economic impact to any particular region. 
 The proposed change will not cause Congress to lose authority over the authorization and 
oversight of the Army or Department of Defense. Military end strength will continue to be 
approval annually through the National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, the 2015 National 
Defense Authorization Act called for the establishment of a national commission that will 
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examine the structure of the Army's mix of Active and Reserve forces. This commission will 
provide Congress the opportunity to have additional input on the Army's size and structure.
91
   
b. The Public  
 The opinions of the general public significantly impact success of any legislation. The 
American public can be expected to be somewhat ambivalent in regards to the proposed change 
to Title 10. Studies indicate that Americans have little interest in military affairs and do not 
support alternatives such as a return to the draft. 
  The military is the smallest since the end of the draft. As a result, less Americans are 
serving, and those who do tend to serve longer. A 2011 survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center concluded that only about 0.5% of Americans has been on active military duty at any 
given time since September 11, 2001.
92
 In addition, although Americans have a high opinion in 
their military, they are increasingly disinterested in military issues. Half of Americans surveyed 
responded that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had made little difference in their lives and only 
36% said the conflicts came up in conversations with family or friends.
93
  
 An alternative to increased reliance on the Reserve Component is a return to the draft. 
The American public is clearly against this option. Survey show that 74-percent of Americans did 
not think the U.S. should return to the draft. In 2007, 87-percent of Americans between the ages 
of 17 and 29 were opposed to reinstating the military draft. As many as 46-percent of college 
graduates said that if implemented, they would avoid the draft.
94
 The proposed legislative change 
will decrease the chances that a future conflict will require the draft to be implemented. Because 
of this, the American public the public can be expected to support it. 
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c. Political Benefits 
 Implementation of the proposed change could have political benefits for the Department 
of Defense. The Army's most powerful advocacy groups are currently rowing in opposite 
directions when it comes to dealing with the effects of budget cuts. The Association of the United 
States Army, a strong supporter of a large Active Component, backs Army efforts to maintain a 
more capable Active Component. Retired General Frederick J. Kroesen, former Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army and senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare, voiced the association's 
view that a robust Active Component is necessary for the Army to perform its role effectively. 
"[AUSA has] long advocated an Army of more than 700,000 as the force required to deter war or 
to win if deterrence failed. Today, there is no apparent support for that Army in Congress, the 




 The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) has maintained that the 
Reserve Component, especially the National Guard, should be an accessible, capable force. The 
NGAUS website outlines the this goal. "As the United States concludes its major overseas ground 
operations, it makes the most sense to maintain to a strong, operational Army National Guard 
used as needed in peacetime and a smaller standing Army as our Founding Fathers intended."
96
 
 Tension between Active and Reserve Component budgets came to a head in February 
2014 when the President of NGAUS criticized the Army Chief's remarks on Guard readiness as 
being "disrespectful and not true."
97
 Both NGAUS and AUSA have expended considerable 
resources lobbying for their viewpoints. Disagreement and bickering between the Army's most 
powerful advocates is not in the best interest of the Department of Defense. 
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 The proposed change to Title 10 will provide the Army greater incentive to integrate the 
Active and Reserve Components into the Total Force. In turn, this would help mend the 
fragmented relationship between the Active Army and National Guard advocacy groups. Both 
AUSA and NGAUS could then focus their considerable political clout on other pressing defense 
related issues such as personnel benefit reform or advocating for a new round of base realignment 
and closures. 
d. Political Costs 
 There is risk that increased reliance on the Reserve Component, especially the Individual 
Ready Reserve, could be perceived as a "back-door draft." The public, unaware of the details of 
military service contracts, may view the involuntary call-up of IRR members negatively. A 
similar backlash occurred in response to the "Stop-loss" policies implemented during the Iraq 
War.  
 An op-ed recently published in the New York Post outlines the view that IRR recall is 
unfair. The author, a former Army junior officer, criticized the President for cutting size of the 
Army while coercing others to active duty to combat the Ebola epidemic in Africa. "Last week’s 
executive order allows the Army to continue reducing the active force by 80,000 soldiers over the 
next four years and to keep sending pink slips to those still serving in Afghanistan, while 
simultaneously allowing the involuntary recall of former service members back to active duty."
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As the IRR becomes more accessible, it will become necessary for the Army to educate both 
service members and the public about the roles and responsibilities of IRR members.  
  
                                                     






8. Recommendation  
 That the Secretary of Defense request the introduction of legislation to increase the 
number of reservists that the President can mobilize for purposes other than war or national 
emergency. This legislative change will provide the Army the flexibility to adapt its structure to 
changing demographics and shrinking budgets while maintaining a quality all-volunteer force. 
 The requirement to maintain a volunteer force will remain for the foreseeable future. 
There is no political or public support for alternatives such as a return to the draft. The Army 
must account for recruiting problems that will result if the Army attempts to regenerate during an 
ongoing conflict. Increased access to the Reserve Component, especially the IRR, for a variety of 
mobilization scenarios will encourage the Army to incorporate the reserves more effectively into 
the Total Force. In addition, it will allow the National Guard to become integrated as a true 
Operational Reserve. 
 When the Army is required to grow in the future, the proposed legislative change will 
ensure the quality of the force remains as high as possible for as long as possible. Substituting 
reservists for volunteers will slow the need for the Army to reduce entrance requirements. In the 
event of full mobilization, the more capable and accessible Reserve Component can be 
augmented by the draft to regenerate a large war-time Army. 
 It is cheaper to use the reserve component. This is important in today's austere budgetary 
environment. Instead of maintaining active units at low readiness levels, the Army will have 
additional incentive to rely on National Guard combat brigades instead.  
 Increased reliance on the reserve component is not without risk. The potential to overuse 
the Reserve Component could result in serious consequences for the Army. It is important for 
policymakers to understand this risk. If the United States becomes involved in a protracted 
conflict in the future, steps must be quickly taken to grow the Active Component to avoid 
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